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INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence1 is generally seen through the lens of the criminal 
justice system, but such cases also pervade the civil justice system. All fifty 
states currently afford domestic violence victims the right to petition for civil 
protection orders.2 Through a civil protection order, a victim may obtain an 
injunction, which offers several forms of relief outside of criminal 
prosecution.3 While civil protection orders should guard against further abuse, 
both their obtainability and their effectiveness are questionable. The 
experiences of Petitioners One and Two4 illustrate some of the underlying 
issues surrounding civil protection order proceedings: 
Petitioner One, a twenty-four-year-old female, has dated Respondent 
One for two years. They have a volatile relationship. One night, Respondent 
confronted Petitioner about suspicious text messages on her cell phone. He 
grabbed her by her arms, shook her, screamed at her, and threatened to hurt 
her. Petitioner filed a petition for a civil protection order against Respondent. 
On the day of the scheduled hearing, Petitioner informed the court that she no 
 
1 For purposes of this Essay, the term “domestic violence” refers to a pattern of behavior—including 
physical, sexual, verbal, and emotional abuse—used by one partner against another in an intimate 
relationship. Margeret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence 
Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2009). 
2 See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice 
as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 519-20 n.3 (2010) 
(citing each state’s respective statute authorizing protection orders). 
3 Id. at 519-20. 
4 These examples have been adapted from the experiences of one of the author’s clinical clients. 
As a law student, Elia Robertson spent a semester as a clinical student at Philadelphia Legal Assistance, 
where she represented low-income clients in their domestic abuse and child custody matters, including 
protection order proceedings. 
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longer wished to pursue a protection order against Respondent and withdrew 
her petition. Petitioner and Respondent left the courthouse together.5 
Petitioner Two is a thirty-three-year-old female. She and Respondent 
Two recently divorced. They have one child together. Respondent has 
physically abused Petitioner in the past. Petitioner now seeks custody of their 
child. She recently filed a petition for a protection order on behalf of the 
child. On the day of the scheduled hearing, both parties entered the courtroom. 
Respondent hired an attorney. Petitioner did not. After closing arguments, the 
judge ruled that he did not find the Petitioner’s testimony credible and 
dismissed her petition for failing to present adequate evidence of abuse.6 
Neither petitioner left the process with what she sought to obtain—a 
protection order.7 Domestic violence continues to plague the United States 
despite the availability of civil remedies.8 Protection order petitions are filed 
at an alarming rate9 and the number of women who become victims of violent 
 
5 Notes of Elia Robertson from Philadelphia Family Court proceedings (Jan.–May 2015) (on 
file with author). 
6 Id. 
7 Scholars and practitioners note the difficulties that domestic abuse victims face in obtaining 
civil protection orders. See, e.g., Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence 
Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 (2000) (noting that the difficulty of proving domestic violence in 
court is a major barrier to the effectiveness of civil protection orders). As a substantive matter, 
proving abuse in court may be difficult because survivors are often the only witnesses. Id. From a 
practical standpoint, even when survivors report abusive incidents, fear of retribution might undermine 
their willingness to testify in court. Cf. Suraji R. Wagage, When the Consequences Are Life and Death: 
Pretrial Detention for Domestic Violence Offenders, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 195, 206 (2014) (“Victims’ desire 
not to press charges or testify, stemming from fear of or attachment to their abusers, ha[s] frequently 
hindered . . . prosecution.”). For certain minority demographics, these problems are compounded 
by social and economic considerations. See Sudha Shetty & Janice Kaguyutan, Immigrant Victims of 
Domestic Violence: Cultural Challenges and Available Legal Protections, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2002), http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.
php?doc_id=384 [https://perma.cc/4SPW-J45V] (noting that many abused immigrant women—
alienated from family and other support networks—must tolerate and endure their abusive 
husbands, who are their sole means of support and livelihood). 
8 See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 10 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D7RW-BEA2] (finding that 22% of surveyed women report being physically assaulted by an intimate 
partner at some point in their lifetime); Will Dunham, Quarter of U.S. Women Suffer Domestic Violence: 
CDC, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/07/us-violence-domestic-
usa-idUSN0737896320080207 [https://perma.cc/56RP-ELS4] (citing a 2005 Center for Disease 
Control study in which 23.6% of women reported being a victim of intimate partner violence and a 
1995 government survey in which 24.8% of women reported suffering domestic violence). 
9 See, e.g., Domestic Violence in the District of Columbia: 2014 Statistical Snapshot, DCCOALITION 
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://dccadv.org/img/fck/file/Domestic%20Violence%20in%
20the%20District%20of%20Columbia%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EZE-GE6U] (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2016) (reporting that petitions for civil protection orders increased 7% from 2012 to 2014). 
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crime by intimate partners each year remains staggeringly high.10 In light of 
these statistics, many scholars have criticized the current civil response to 
domestic violence as being ineffective.11 Suggestions for improvements range 
from strengthening the criminal justice system’s involvement12 to eliminating 
formal judicial systems and returning to community-based interventions.13 
This Essay calls attention to various deficiencies underlying the civil 
protection order process. It argues that the parties in the above scenarios would 
have benefited from a more holistic and less adversarial approach to their 
disputes. Specifically, this Essay advocates for an alternative approach to 
protection order proceedings that draws on two legal theories, therapeutic 
jurisprudence14 and restorative justice.15 This approach better addresses 
litigants’ needs by acknowledging that complex relationships permeate 
domestic violence incidents. Such an approach could alleviate systemic issues 
currently facing family courts and have a lasting, positive impact on entire 
communities. This Essay uses the Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act and 
the Philadelphia Family Court Division as a template to highlight the 
shortcomings of current family court systems. It then offers a solution to 
supplement and improve upon current civil protection order proceedings. 
Part I of this Essay sets forth the current civil response to domestic 
violence cases, including Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act. Part II 
provides an overview of both therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice 
and their relationship to one another. Part III outlines the main arguments 
against therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice as alternative 
responses to domestic violence. Part IV tackles those criticisms and argues 
that both theories can successfully coexist within the current paradigm. It 
highlights the parallel goals of the current system and the two approaches and 
explores their potential inclusion in existing statutes, such as Pennsylvania’s 
Protection from Abuse Act. The Essay concludes by discussing how the case 
 
10 Each year, about 588,490 women are victims of violence by an intimate partner. CALLIE MARIE 
RENNISON, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197838, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, at 1 tbl.1 
(2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6CS-VGFR]. 
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, VAWA @ 20: Improving Civil Legal Assistance for Ending Gender 
Violence, CUNY L. REV. FOOTNOTE FORUM (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cunylawreview.org/vawa-20-
improving-civil-legal-assistance-for-ending-gender-violence-by-elizabeth-macdowell [https://perma.cc/
M3QF-CMT4] (discussing the failure of the Violence Against Women Act to address the limitations of 
civil responses to domestic violence). 
12 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1507-08 (1998) (arguing that the criminal justice system’s “preference 
for treatment as punishment for domestic violence offenders is misguided”). 
13 See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra subsection II.A.1. 
15 See infra subsection II.A.2. 
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studies of Petitioner One and Two could benefit from therapeutic 
jurisprudence and restorative justice principles. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The current civil response to domestic violence cases consists primarily of 
civil protection order proceedings. This Part provides a brief history of civil 
protection order statutes and a detailed explanation of Pennsylvania’s Protection 
from Abuse Act.16 It then discusses the inherent challenges underlying 
protection order proceedings and their ineffectiveness in family courts. 
A. Traditional Civil Remedies for Domestic Violence Cases 
Civil protection order statutes serve as a critical resource for domestic 
violence survivors.17 Civil protection orders function as both an alternative 
and a supplement to the criminal justice system.18 Criminal sentences are 
typically reserved for “well-documented, long-standing patterns of violence 
or [for] particular violent acts.”19 Where criminal proceedings fail, civil 
protection orders become essential to maintaining the safety of survivors 
whose abusers are not criminally liable for abuse.20 
1. Protection Orders Generally 
Since their inception in the 1970s,21 civil protection order statutes have 
expanded, both in their scope of coverage and breadth of relief.22 For example, 
statutes historically only afforded relief to those in state-recognized relationships 
but now extend protection to a broader array of relationships, including current 
and past intimate partners and individuals who share a home.23 Similarly, 
while older statutes only offered limited forms of relief (such as stay away 
orders), many statutes now include “child custody, visitation, spousal and child 
 
16 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101–6122 (2016). 
17 Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress 
and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOCIAL POL’Y & L. 567, 584 (2003). 
18 Id. at 586. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. at 585-86 (noting that criminal prosecution is usually limited to ongoing or more 
extreme instances of domestic violence). 
21 Kohn, supra note 2, at 524. 
22 See, e.g., Richard A. DuBose III, Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen: Through the Eyes of 
the Victim—Maryland’s Civil Protection Order and the Role of the Court, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 237, 242-
43 (2003) (comparing the expanded definition of abuse, the classes of persons eligible for relief, and 
the relief provided for in Maryland’s 1992 domestic violence statute with the previous 1980 Act). 
23 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 524-25. 
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support, and participation in court-ordered alcohol, drug, and batterer 
intervention programs” as alternative forms of relief.24 
2. The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act: A Case Study 
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act serves as one example of a 
typical civil protection order statute.25 The Act provides a civil remedy for 
domestic violence survivors through Protection from Abuse (PFA) orders.26 A 
Pennsylvania citizen may seek a PFA against any household or family member 
including a spouse, sibling, parent, child, or current or former intimate partner.27 
A judge may issue a PFA order that is classified as protection-only,28 full no 
contact,29 or no contact with eviction.30 It also may include custody31 and support 
provisions for cases involving minor children,32 as well as a weapons provision 
ordering the perpetrator to surrender weapons in his or her possession.33 
The Act defines abuse to include:  
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing 
bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual 
intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent 
assault, indecent assault, or incest with or without a deadly weapon[;]  
(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury[;] 
(3) The infliction of false imprisonment . . . [;] (4) Physically or sexually 
abusing minor children . . . [; and] (5) Knowingly engaging in a course of 
conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including 
 
24 Id. at 525. 
25 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6101–6122 (2016). 
26 Id. § 6108(a). While the statute itself only refers to “protection orders,” orders entered 
pursuant to the Protection from Abuse Act are referred to as PFA orders in common practice. See, 
e.g., Protection from Abuse Orders (PFA), WOMENSLAW.ORG, http://www.womenslaw.org/laws_
state_type.php?id=10027&state_code=PA [https://perma.cc/F6R7-RUBQ] (last updated Jan. 9, 
2015) (describing the process for obtaining protection orders in Pennsylvania and using the term 
“PFA” or “protection from abuse order”). 
27 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(a) (allowing a court to grant a PFA to prevent “abuse” of a 
plaintiff or minor children); see also id. § 6102(a) (defining “abuse” as any of an enumerated list of 
acts committed between “family or household memers, sexual or intimate partners or persons who 
share biological parenthood”). 
28 See id. § 6108(a)(1) (providing protection-only relief, which “[d]irect[s] the defendant to 
refrain from abusing the plaintiff or minor children”). 
29 See id. § 6108(a)(6) (prohibiting the defendant “from having any contact with the plaintiff 
or minor children). 
30 See id. § 6108(a)(2) (granting “possession to the plaintiff of the residence or household to the 
exclusion of the defendant by evicting the defendant or restoring possession to the plaintiff . . . .”). 
31 See id. § 6108(a)(4) (providing “temporary custody of or establishing temporary visitation 
rights with regard to minor children”). 
32 See id. § 6108(a)(5) (ordering “the defendant to pay financial support to those persons the 
defendant has a duty to support”). 
33 Id. § 6108(a)(7). 
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following the person . . . under circumstances which place the person in 
reasonable fear of bodily injury.34 
A person seeking a PFA must first file a petition in the Court of Common 
Pleas.35 If the petitioner alleges “immediate and present danger of abuse,” a 
judge must hold an ex parte hearing to review the petition.36 There, the judge 
decides whether to issue a temporary PFA and schedule a full hearing, 
schedule a full hearing without issuing a temporary PFA, or dismiss the 
petition.37 If a temporary PFA is granted, it remains in effect until the full 
hearing.38 Regardless of whether the judge issues a temporary order, a full 
hearing must be scheduled within ten business days of the filing of the 
petition.39 Between the ex parte hearing and the full hearing, the petitioner 
must serve the respondent with the PFA petition.40 
At the full hearing, a judge will decide whether to issue a final PFA.41 A 
final PFA may be issued after: (1) an agreement between the parties, (2) an 
agreement without admission, (3) a hearing and decision by the court, or  
(4) by “default,” after a hearing where the defendant failed to appear despite 
proper service.42 At the hearing, both parties will have an opportunity to 
testify and present evidence.43 While both parties have the right to be 
 
34 Id. § 6102(a). 
35 See PA. R. CIV. P. 1901.3(a) (providing that, with one exception, protection order actions must 
begin with a petition to a court of common pleas describing the alleged acts of abuse by the defendant). 
36 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(b)(1). 
37 Id. § 6107(b). 
38 Id. § 6107(b)(2). 
39 Id. § 6107(a). 
40 Id. At a judge’s discretion, a sheriff or other designated official may serve the defendant. Id. 
§ 6106(f). However, in practice, petitioners often bear the responsibility of seeking assistance from the 
police. See FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE PHILA. BAR ASS’N, PETITION FOR PROTECTION FROM 
ABUSE: INSTRUCTION SHEET ¶ 5 (2011), www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/forms/domestic-relations/Petition-
for-Protection-From-Abuse-w-instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6ZR-CMVK] (suggesting that 
petitioners seek service assistance from the police). 
41 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(a) (allowing a judge to issue a PFA “to bring about a 
cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children”). 
42 See PA. R. CIV. P. 1905(e) (requiring a PFA to indicate which of the above situations led to 
the order being issued). 
43 See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, DECIDING CHILD CUSTODY WHEN THERE IS DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: A BENCHBOOK FOR PENNSYLVANIA COURTS 49-60 (rev. 2013), http://www.
womenslawproject.org/resources/Benchbook_FINAL_Mar2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7KP-35K3] 
(noting that evidence presented in PFA hearings is governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 
and discussing considerations for particular types of evidence presented in the domestic violence 
context, including victim testimony, evidence of criminal conduct, photographs, business records, 
and expert testimony). 
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represented,44 most are not.45 If a final PFA is issued, a petitioner is entitled 
to court-ordered protection for up to three years.46 When a respondent 
violates either a temporary or a final PFA, a petitioner may call the police, who 
will arrest the respondent and charge him or her with criminal contempt, or 
may file a complaint for criminal contempt even in the absence of an arrest.47 
Statistics from Philadelphia illustrate the relative frequency of the varying 
levels of protection available through the courts. In 2013, the Philadelphia 
Family Court, the largest family court system in Pennsylvania, disposed of 
almost 10,000 PFA petitions.48 In over half of those cases, the petitioner did not 
appear for the hearing.49 In 1103 cases, the petitioner withdrew the petition.50 
Among the remaining approximately 3000 dispositions, almost half resulted in 
stipulations or agreements between the parties.51 Of 12,000 total petitioners who 
filed for protection orders in 2013, only 1060 received final orders.52 
 
44 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111 (“A domestic violence counselor/advocate may accompany a 
party to any legal proceeding or hearing under this chapter.”). 
45 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response 
to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 109 (2001) 
(citing a study of Maricopa County, Arizona, which found that in 1990, at least one of the parties in 
family law cases was unrepresented in over 88% of cases). An abused litigant’s ability to secure a 
PFA—specifically, one that affords adequate relief—often turns on whether that party retained 
representation in the matter. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection 
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 845 (1993) 
(“[B]attered women who can obtain legal assistance from trained counsel are much more likely to 
receive civil protection orders which contain complete and effective relief.”). The disparity in results 
between represented and unrepresented parties is particularly troubling given that a sizable majority 
of litigants in domestic violence cases proceed without representation. See, e.g., Susan B. Sorenson, 
Violence Against Women in Philadelphia—A Report to the City 15 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1180&context=spp_papers [https://perma.cc/
5SRQ-5S4H] (indicating that about four out of five petitioners in Philadelphia proceed without 
representation). In addition to enduring the emotional and physical trauma, a litigant without counsel 
must be vigilant to become acquainted with and abide by the many nuanced procedural and substantive 
rules attendant to civil litigation. Cf. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 
47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 748 (2015) (“[P]ro se parties routinely flunk basic procedural entrance exams 
. . . . Failure to clear procedural hurdles often results in negative case outcomes . . . .”). For further 
discussion on pro se litigants see infra Section I.B.2. 
46 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(d). 
47 PA. R. CIV. P. § 1901.5. 
48 Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, Protection from Abuse, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA.,  
http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/research-and-statistics/protection-from-abuse [https://
perma.cc/RPW7-9H6X] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (select “Philadelphia”). 
49 In 5533 cases, the plaintiff did not appear. Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. (reporting that 1346 cases were resolved by stipulation or agreement). 
52 A number of variables account for the discrepancy between the volume of PFA filings and 
the limited number of petitioners receiving final orders. For instance, petitioners may decline to 
pursue their PFA on account of fear or attachment to their abuser. See supra note 7. Procedural 
mechanisms may also impede or wholly deter service of process. See Sorenson, supra note 45, at 17 
(“[P]etitioner[s] . . . risk[] further abuse when attempting to serve court papers on the defendant.”). 
The inherent complexity of filing and subsequently prosecuting a PFA may also attribute to the 
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B. Unique Challenges Presented by Protection Order Proceedings 
While crucial, the process to obtain a PFA is far from ideal. Nationwide, 
scholars and practitioners alike cite to logistical infirmities that pervade the 
process of both obtaining and enforcing PFA orders.53 Protection order 
proceedings pose unique challenges for litigants and attorneys alike. Among 
them, congested court dockets, inadequate resources, unrepresented  
litigants, and challenging subject matter are most prominent. This Section 
analyzes each challenge in turn. 
1. Congested Court Dockets and Inadequate Resources 
Most family court systems operate without essential resources. They lack 
adequate judicial training,54 evidence gathering assistance, expert witness 
services, and the capability to handle high-risk cases.55 Some scholars 
attribute this lack of resources in part to the sheer volume of case filings.56 In 
 
inverse ratio between filings and final orders; cf. id. (“The process is complex, particularly for the 
more than one in five Philadelphia residents who lack basic literacy skills.”). 
53 See supra note 7. 
54 Judges receive specialized training with which to treat domestic violence cases. See, e.g., 
Sorenson, supra note 45, at 18 (“[J]udges [in Philadelphia] participate in two statewide conferences 
each year as well as self-initiated in-service training over a lunch hour each month.”). That said, such 
trainings alone are likely insufficient. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 
58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1072 n.52 (1995) (“The judicial education provided should be much more than 
an hour or two of talking heads.”). This problem becomes exacerbated in light of family courts’ 
resource deficiency. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, JUSTICE IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
DIVISION OF PHILADELPHIA FAMILY COURT: A REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 11 (2003), 
http://www.womenslawproject.org/resources/WLP_FamlyCourt.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD5B-
NCLB] (“While court administrators have been working hard to improve the experience of litigants 
in the Domestic Relations Division, they are severely limited by the amount of available resources.”); 
FAMILY COURT TASK FORCE, THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, A CALL TO ACTION: THE 
CRISIS IN FAMILY COURT 9-11, 16-17 (2009), http://moderncourts.org/files/
2013/10/a_call_to_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/D56M-LJQW] (identifying judicial training and 
resources as areas in need of improvement in New York family courts). 
55 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 578-79 (“[D]ecision-making resources—such as . . . resources 
for evidence gathering; the services of expert witnesses; [and] rapid response capability for high risk 
cases—are far outmatched by the demand for case resolution.” (footnote omitted)); see also Jacquelyn 
C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case 
Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1093-96 tbl.2 (2003) (concluding that certain risk factors 
exist and can be used as a proxy to identify “high risk” domestic abuse cases more likely to result in 
death; such factors include incidents of prior abuse, abuser’s access to a gun, stalking, forced sex, 
and abuse during pregnancy). 
56 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 577-78 (“One reason for the resource inadequacy is the 
huge volume of cases in many jurisdictions, both in family law generally, and in civil protective order 
proceedings in particular.”). 
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the United States, an estimated five million domestic relations cases were 
filed in 2008.57 Filings continue to increase but resources remain limited.58 
As a result of the lack of resources, judges presiding over protection order 
proceedings may favor efficiency over thoroughness.59 Hearings are generally 
brief60 and discovery requests are often discouraged or even precluded.61 
Thus, even to the extent that victims of domestic violence are provided 
protections by the law and the opportunity to obtain PFAs, busy court 
dockets, a lack of court resources, and a lack of judges often prevent those 
victims from vindicating their rights. 
2. Unrepresented Litigants 
Many family court litigants are unrepresented, especially in protective 
order and custody cases.62 In a survey conducted by the American Judicature 
 
57 R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 14 (2012), http://
www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx [https://
perma.cc/X93Q-H86E]. “Domestic relations” cases are typically adjudicated in specialized family 
court systems that operate as appendages of civil courts. In Philadelphia, domestic relations cases 
are handled in the Family Division. Family Division, PHILA. CTS., http://courts.phila.gov/common-
pleas/family/ [https://perma.cc/U8EP-36LD] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). The juvenile branch 
involves juvenile court operations, juvenile probation, and adoption proceedings. Id. Domestic relations 
matters involve paternity, support, custody, visitation, and divorce—and of most relevance, domestic 
violence. Id.; see also PA. R. CIV. P. 1931(a) (enumerating the types of actions governed by Pennsylvania 
family court’s procedural rules). More broadly, domestic relations cases are generally thought to include 
divorce/dissolution, paternity, custody, support, visitation, adoption, and civil protection/restraining 
order cases. See LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra, at 17 (listing the types of domestic relations cases). 
58 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Progressive legislation has improved substantive 
remedies available to domestic violence victims. See Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized 
Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1291 
(2000) (noting that 1990 legislation, which both criminalized domestic violence and provided victims 
with greater remedies, marked a turning point in public discourse and perception of domestic 
violence as a criminal transgression). Despite these substantive improvements, pragmatic 
deficiencies often preclude abused parties from realizing them. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 578 
(“[Protective order] case loads have expanded significantly in recent decades, but resources within 
the family court system have not increased sufficiently to meet the need.”). Such deficiencies include, 
“inadequate or no legal representation [for the abused]; overburdened, inexperienced or poorly 
trained judges; and informal, rushed, often very brief legal hearings.” Id. at 568 n.1. In Philadelphia, 
only two judges are assigned to handle all PFA petitions, which routinely total over 12,000 annual 
filings. WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, at 10; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
59 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 584 (“Proceedings in which domestic violence issues are at 
the forefront are especially likely to be mishandled.”). 
60 See id. at 579 (“[I]n family law cases, proceedings are often brief.”). 
61 Id. Discovery in civil protective order cases is generally difficult because of the short time 
between the entrance of a temporary restraining order and the final restraining order hearing. See 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(a) (2016) (requiring a plaintiff to prove his or her allegations within ten 
days of the filing of a petition). Many state rules permit discovery only upon a showing of “good 
cause” and requests are rarely made or granted. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 579 n.35. 
62 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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Society and the State Justice Institute (AJS/SJI), 65.1% of all judges surveyed—
both from family courts and nonfamily courts—indicated that the number of 
self-represented litigants in their courtrooms increased moderately or greatly 
over the past five years.63 These statistics are only amplified in family courts; 
pro se appearances are extremely common in domestic relations cases.64 One 
explanation for this is that many low and moderate income litigants cannot 
afford to hire a lawyer.65 
The increasing number of self-represented litigants66 further burdens family 
court systems. Pro se litigation presents due process concerns.67 Litigants who 
appear in court without representation are substantially less likely to understand 
legal proceedings than represented litigants.68  Self-represented litigants may 
also fail to present their cases effectively because they struggle with legal 
procedures, courtroom decorum, and rules of evidence.69 This lack of knowledge 
translates to a lack of access to justice for litigants who cannot effectively 
navigate the system without an attorney.70 This issue is exacerbated when a pro 
se litigant faces a party who has counsel.71 
Pro se appearances also complicate court processes and the roles of court 
staff, administrators, and judges.72 Self-represented litigants often seek 
assistance when filling out court forms and other documents, which takes 
 
63 JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A 
REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 117 (1998). 
64 See, e.g., WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, at 48 tbl.8 (concluding that nearly 80% of 
petitioners and 75% respondents in protection from abuse and custody cases proceeded without counsel). 
65 Berenson, supra note 45, at 117. 
66 See id. at 105 (“[T]he number of self-represented litigants continues to expand.”). 
67 Unlike in the criminal realm, litigants in civil proceedings are not entitled to representation. See 
supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. However, many argue that family court proceedings involve 
constitutionally protected liberty interests. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (finding 
a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”). 
68 See Berenson, supra note 45, at 115 (discussing the “difficulties of navigating complex, 
confusing, and often convoluted legal procedures without the assistance of counsel”). 
69 See id. (stating that judges realize that “self-represented parties’ unfamiliarity with legal 
procedures or the rules of evidence may result in the denial of meritorious claims”). 
70 See LeeAnn Iovanni & Susan L. Miller, Criminal Justice System Responses to Domestic Violence: Law 
Enforcement and the Courts (reporting that victims not represented by counsel are less likely to receive 
protective orders, or if they do, the orders are likely to lack needed provisions excluding the offender from 
the residence and concerning child custody, visitation and child support), in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 303, 313-14 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001). 
71 When this occurs, studies suggest that pro se litigants must not only navigate an unfamiliar 
legal system but overcome a certain degree of perceived nepotism where an opposing counsel and 
judge have a prior familiarity. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, at 91 (“Some [litigants] 
express concern about spousal relatives on court staff or their spouse’s attorney winning based on a 
relationship with the judge, rather than the merits of the case.”). 
72 See Berenson, supra note 45, at 112 (stating that pro se litigants place burdens on the court 
system “that would not exist if all litigants were represented by lawyers,” such as increased time or 
court resources needed to process cases). 
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court personnel away from their other duties.73 As one judge responded to 
the AJS/SJI survey, “self-represented litigants’ ‘lack of experience and 
inability to understand elementary proceedings’ . . . caus[es] the prolonging 
of proceedings [and] plac[es] ‘a great burden on the court.’”74 Thus, the high 
percentage of unrepresented litigants in family court presents challenges both 
to the courts and to the litigants themselves. Courts’ resources are scarce and 
caseloads are high, while self-represented litigants have a more difficult time 
obtaining the desired relief and often feel like the deck is stacked against them. 
3. Challenging Subject Matter 
Protection order proceedings involve a complex and often personal 
subject matter.75 Domestic violence cases involve a range of circumstances, 
including relationships characterized by dominance and control, incidents of 
violence that may vary in significance depending on circumstances about 
which little or no reliable evidence may be available, parties’ psychological 
dysfunctions, and conflicts where both parties’ behavior arguably violates a 
statute, but it is unclear whether either party is a danger to the other.76 
In light of these complicated topics, factfinders tasked with deciding 
whether to issue a protection order must weigh a host of concerns, such as 
balancing competing social priorities.77 For example, where proceedings 
involve custody disputes, promoting parent–child relationships often 
conflicts with the need to protect children from physical and emotional 
 
73 See id. at 113 (describing the disproportionate share of their “scarce time” that judges spend 
“guiding self-represented litigants through the labyrinth of pre-trial and trial practice”). 
74 GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 63, at 53. 
75 See Tsai, supra note 58, at 1293 (noting that the complex matters in domestic violence involve 
issues relating to family dynamics and emotional relationships that are not paralleled in other crimes). 
76 For a discussion on the nuanced aspects of domestic violence cases, see Freedman, supra note 
17, at 580-83. Freedman states that 
[d]omestic violence issues typically include[] a variety of circumstances, including: 
textbook examples of male dominance . . . ; specific incidents of violent or threatening 
behavior by one or both parties . . . ; cases in which, in addition to evidence of domestic 
violence, the non-violent partner seems to be suffering from serious personal dysfunctions 
. . . ; cases in which the parties are engaged in intense conflict and both parties’ behavior 
is arguably in violation of the civil protective order statute, but it is not clear whether either 
party is dangerous. 
Id. at 580-81. Despite this complex range of issues, lack of funding and other resources preclude 
judges from dedicating sufficient time to such issues. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, 
at 59 tbl.9 (reporting that, of the observed proceedings in 2002, more than half of the PFA hearings 
filed in Philadelphia were completed in five minutes or less). 
77 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 584 (describing how courts might weigh the abuse of the 
parent or child against other factors in determining custody). 
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harm.78 Judges must also make important determinations that affect litigants’ 
personal lives through the limited lens of a single hearing.79 Ann Freedman 
posits that judicial decisions made in light of testimony taken during a 
protection order hearing “may have little or no relationship to the lived reality 
of family life.”80 The complex subject matter of domestic violence cases thus 
compounds the problems presented by crowded court dockets and the high 
percentage of unrepresented litigants, which taken together may lead to 
results that are not founded on the realities of the situation. 
C. Courts’ Mishandling of Civil Domestic Violence Cases 
Due in part to the challenges facing family courts, protection order 
statutes have been left compromised and improperly enforced. Protective 
order petitions that should be granted may be denied or inadequately 
enforced when violated.81 Rather than pursue their PFA formally before the 
court, victims may reach an agreement82 with their alleged abuser when 
testifying could risk their safety or require more resources than are available 
to them.83 Additionally, when proceedings involve children, their well-being 
may be neglected.84 This may occur because a false claim of abuse succeeds 
or, even more concerning, because abuse cannot be demonstrated to the 
 
78 But see generally Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: 
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
657 (2003) (arguing that, despite concerns to protect children’s relationships with both parents, 
domestic violence should be given decisive weight when making custody decisions). 
79 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 581-82 (“The task of deciding which cases deserve legal 
intervention . . . is extremely difficult even with time for reflection, which is generally not available.”). 
80 Id. at 582. 
81 For example, Philadelphia’s City Council has conducted hearings and heard testimony 
regarding enforcement issues surrounding protective orders. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra 
note 54, at 78. Testimony highlighted the administrative difficulty of enforcing orders confiscating 
an abuser’s weapon, as only one sheriff was assigned to perform that task. Id. Batterers ordered to 
attend anger management class may be disinclined to do so, because no adequate mechanism exists 
to ensure compliance. Id. “While court judgments mark the end point of many legal disputes . . . 
domestic violence . . . cases often require longer term judicial oversight and extended social services 
. . . . [T]hese cases begin rather than end with a judge’s ruling.” Freedman, supra note 17, at 569. 
82 The relief afforded by Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act can come by way of a 
protection from abuse order or a consent agreement between the parties. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 6108(a) (2016) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agreement to 
bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children.”). Because a consent order is by 
agreement of the parties, any factfinding is rendered superfluous and thus victims are not required 
to testify against their abuser in court. 
83 See, e.g., Meier, supra note 78, at 664-65 (describing a child custody case in which a mother 
gave up custody of her child to the abuser rather than continuing to litigate before a hostile judge). 
84 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 581-82 (describing factors courts consider in these cases that 
might conflict with the child’s safety, such as “encouraging cooperation between parents”). 
1570 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1557 
court’s satisfaction.85 In sum, protection order statutes currently do not serve 
the single most important purpose underlying their enactment: to protect 
domestic violence victims and decrease incidents of domestic violence.86 
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:  
A PARADIGM SHIFT 
This Part discusses a recent paradigm shift within the legal community: 
the comprehensive law movement. It focuses specifically on two alternative 
approaches proposed by the movement: therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice. It details the foundational principles of both theories and 
their growing popularity within the United States and internationally, and 
highlights the benefits and drawbacks of each. Finally, this Part discusses the 
similarities and differences between the two theories, and suggests that both 
can be combined to further one holistic, therapeutic approach to legal 
practice, which can then be applied to the civil protection order process. 
A. The Comprehensive Law Movement 
Over the last two decades, attorneys and scholars alike have expressed 
dissatisfaction with traditional legal systems, particularly in family law.87 
Specifically, critics assert that the complexities surrounding family law issues 
are not adequately addressed by ordinary legal means.88 As a result, 
alternative forms of law practice have emerged in an effort to incorporate 
interdisciplinary approaches into historically adversarial paradigms.89 A 
number of these approaches are rapidly gaining popularity, including 
 
85 See id. at 584 (discussing the problem of false claims and skeptical courts with “limited  
fact-finding resources”). 
86 The current system’s failures to protect domestic violence victims are not limited to the 
courts. For example, in 2011, nearly one in ten emergency calls to the Philadelphia Police 
Department for assistance were determined by the dispatcher to be domestic violence related, and 
of these, the response time was sixteen minutes. Sorenson, supra note 45, at 9. 
87 See Marsha B. Freeman, Comparing Philosophies and Practices of Family Law Between the United 
States and Other Nations: The Flinstones vs. The Jetsons, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 249, 254 (2010) (“There is 
no dearth of voices in the United States today advocating the use of collaborative and therapeutic 
jurisprudential philosophies and methodologies in a multitude of family law issues.”). See generally 
Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006) (comparing the integrative practice “vectors” that characterize the 
comprehensive law approach with the dominant traditional lawyering model). 
88 See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing the “concrete processes” that emerge from 
more therapeutic approaches to family law and highlighting that the comprehensive process vector 
of “collaborative law” emerged from a search for a less emotionally damaging and more economical 
way to resolve divorce cases). 
89 See id. at 8 (“Because of the emotional devastation that can result from traditional adversarial 
litigation, many of the vectors explicitly seek non-litigious solutions to legal problems . . . . Many 
utilize collborative methods in solving legal problems.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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collaborative law, creative problem solving, holistic justice, preventive law, 
problem solving courts, procedural justice, restorative justice, therapeutic 
jurisprudence, and transformative mediation.90 Together, they represent “the 
comprehensive law movement.”91 
Although individual approaches vary, the comprehensive law movement 
generally seeks to advance two common goals: (1) maximizing the emotional, 
psychological, and relational well-being of individuals and communities 
involved in legal proceedings, and (2) focusing on concerns outside of strict 
legal rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, and entitlements.92 Many 
approaches seek nonlitigious solutions to legal problems and instead utilize 
collaborative and therapeutic methods to achieve legal objectives. This Essay 
focuses specifically on two related theories within the comprehensive 
movement—therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice—and their 
potential effect on protection order proceedings. 
1. Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is “the study of the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent . . . .”93 It involves the use of various social sciences to 
 
90 Id. at 1-2. 
91 Although it lacks a precise definition, the term “comprehensive law movement” first appeared 
in 2000. Daicoff, supra note 87, at 3. The term now appears throughout recent literature. See, e.g., James 
Coben & Penelope Harley, Intentional Conversations about Restorative Justice, Mediation and the Practice of 
Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235, 260 (2004) (“The lawyer as a healer is part of a wider 
evoluation in practice approaches collectively labeled the comprehensive or transformational law 
movement . . . .”); Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 
135 (2004) (“One of the key attributes of this comprehensive law movement is its interdisciplinary 
approach.”); Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Lawyer Heal Thy Self: Incorporating Mindfulness into Legal Education 
& Profession, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 23 (2015) (“Today, many law schools, bar associations, and legal 
practitioners have endorsed the training and joined the Comphrehensive Law movement. . . .”); Pauline 
H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 333 (2004) (“Susan Daicoff sees 
collaborative law as one of a variety of ‘vectors’ in what she calls the ‘comprehensive law’ movement 
. . . .”); David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353, 353 (2004) (“What I would like 
to do is talk a little bit about therapeutic jurisprudence and its relationship to the bulk of the other 
vectors in the comprehensive law movement.”). See generally Susan Swaim Daicoff, Families in Circle 
Process: Resorative Justice in Family Law, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 427 (2015) (explaining the use of the “circle 
process” within the broader context of the “comprehensive law movement”). 
92 See Daicoff, supra note 87, at 4 (“[The movement] values the law’s potential as an agent of 
positive interpersonal and individual change . . . [and] integrates . . . extralegal concerns . . . into 
law and legal practice.”). 
93 David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 17, 18 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991). Wexler and Winnick were 
the first to formalize the application of therapeutic jurisprudence and continue to promote 
therapeutic jurisprudence and advocate for its incorporation into the traditional courtroom setting. 
BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, Introduction to JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 3, 3-7 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick 
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determine “the extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the 
psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects.”94 Rather than 
defining law as a set of formal principles, therapeutic jurisprudence regards 
law as a “social force that produces behaviours and consequences.”95 It aims 
to achieve positive therapeutic consequences and eliminate or minimize 
antitherapeutic consequences for all parties involved, all else being equal.96 
Often regarded as an academic discipline, therapeutic jurisprudence serves 
as a “lens or perspective” through which other alternative forms of law practice 
may be viewed.97 Its principles inform other aspects of the comprehensive law 
movement, including restorative justice practices.98 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
thus serves as a foundational or supplemental aspect of alternative approaches.99 
First applied to mental health law in the 1990s, therapeutic jurisprudence 
has since influenced several other legal fields, including workers’ compensation 
law, sexual orientation law, disability law, fault-based tort compensation 
schemes, contract law, and family law.100 While therapeutic jurisprudence has 
been adopted in both the United States and Canada, it is far more widely 
practiced in Canada, especially in family law.101 For example, in a majority of 
 
eds., 2003) (highlighting a new style of court that is equipped to handle interdisciplinary problems 
to advocate for a more therapeutic approach). 
94 Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y. & L. 193, 196 (1995). For a discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence principles in practice, see 
generally Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: A 
Combined Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25 (1997). 
95 Valmaine Toki, Domestic Violence and Women: Can a Therapeutic Approach Assist?, 78 REVISTA 
JURÍDICA UPR 61, 69 (2009). 
96 Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 184, 188 (1997). 
97 See Wexler, supra note 91, at 357 (“[T]his lens or perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence has 
become an active partner of many . . . practical [legal] processes . . . .”). 
98 See infra Section II.A.2. 
99 See Wexler, supra note 91, at 357-58 (noting that research motivated by therapeutic 
jurisprudence undergirds both the comparative law movement and practical professional innovations, 
yielding “new and effective legal arrangements”). 
100 See Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings: 
A Family Systems Approach, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 951, 953 (1999) (“Child welfare proceedings 
exhibit a number of characteristics that make them particularly well-suited for the application of 
[therapeutic jurisprudence] . . . .”); Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33 (2000) (applying therapeutic jurisprudence to the processing of domestic 
violence cases); see also Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventative Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 18 (1997) (“Although the 
approach originated in the area of mental health law, it has quickly expanded beyond that context, and 
has become a mental health law approach to law generally . . . . [T]he therapeutic jurisprudence 
perspective has recently been applied in the contexts of criminal law, family law, juvenile law, disability 
law, discrimination law, health law, evidence law, tort law, contracts and commercial law, labor 
arbitration, workers’ compensation law, probate law, and legal profession.”). 
101 See Freeman, supra note 87, at 256-57 (noting that in the United States, acceptance of 
therapeutic jurisprudence is primarily theoretical, while it is widely practiced in Canada). 
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Canadian family law cases, “family circles, or conferences, replace court 
procedures entirely to resolve the family law issues at hand in a far more 
collaborative method.”102 Canadian courts applying therapeutic justice forego 
traditional trial and sentencing techniques103 and instead engage in family 
conferencing to achieve a more therapeutic result.104 
2. Restorative Justice 
a. Restorative Justice Defined 
“Restorative justice” is the “process of bringing together the individuals who 
have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the 
harm caused by the crime.”105 Restorative justice practices focus not only on the 
crime itself, but also on “the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the 
future.”106 It seeks to “restore victims, restore offenders, and restore communities 
in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.”107 It places victims, offenders, and 
communities “in active roles to work together to . . . [e]mpower victims in their 
search for closure[,] [i]mpress upon offenders the real human impact of their 
behavior[, and p]romote restitution to victims and communities.”108 
 
102 Id. 
103 See, e.g., NAT’L JUDICIAL INST., PROBLEM-SOLVING IN CANADA’S COURTROOMS: A 
GUIDE TO THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE 7-19 (2011) (discussing Canadian courts’ application of 
restorative justice principles in domestic violence matters). 
104 See Freeman, supra note 87, at 255-56 (“[I]n Canada . . . traditional trial and sentencing 
techniques are generally replaced by collaborative family conferencing in an effort to effectuate 
results that take into account the needs of all and attempts to best arrive at a satisfactory solution.”). 
Stu Webb, who also writes extensively on restorative justice concepts, highlighted the success of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and collaborative methods in a small area of Canada and noted that in a 
community of about 50,000, 16 of the 17 family practitioners attended collaborative trainings; within 
a year, the family court docket had decreased significantly, and one family court judge was actually 
reassigned to a different court. Stu Webb, Note, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Its 
History and Current Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 164 (2008). 
105 John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA 
L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized]. 
106 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME 
& JUST. 1, 5 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Restorative Justice]. 
107 Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized, supra note 105, at 1743. 
108 MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & PEACEMAKING, 
DIRECTORY OF VICTIM–OFFENDER MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, at vii 
(2000); see also J. KIM WRIGHT, LAWYERS AS PEACEMAKERS: PRACTICING HOLISTIC, PROBLEM-
SOLVING LAW 323 (2010) (explaining that the goal of restorative justice is solving problems for the 
future rather than assigning blame for the past). 
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Primarily utilized in the criminal law context, restorative justice has 
become increasingly popular in Canada,109 Australia,110 the United 
Kingdom,111 and Japan.112 In some countries, it has even replaced traditional 
forms of criminal law proceedings.113 However, the use of restorative justice 
in the United States remains relatively limited.114 Given the United States’ 
focus on preserving constitutional rights and procedural due process, 
restorative justice has been utilized “as an enhancement, rather than as a 
substitute for existing criminal law procedures.”115 
b. Restorative Justice Processes 
In practice, restorative justice typically involves a collaborative process 
akin to victim–offender mediation.116 The victim, the offender, and, if 
appropriate, other members of the community, meet to participate in some 
 
109 See Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the Lawyer’s Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 113, 118 (2009) (“Collaborative law is now found in most metropolitan areas in . . . Canada.”). 
110 See generally, e.g., Lisbeth T. Pike & Paul T. Murphy, The Columbus Pilot in the Family Court 
of Western Australia, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 270 (2006). The Columbus Program seeks to assist divorced 
or separated parents in conflict resolution and was designed as an early intervention tool for complex 
cases, especially those involving multiple allegations of abuse and violence. Id. at 270-71. It succeeded 
the Magellan Project, another Australian program, which sought to manage high conflict, abusive 
relationships through therapeutic methodologies. Id. 
111 See Anna Bawden, How Restorative Justice Is Steering Young Offenders Away from Crime, 
GUARDIAN (London) (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/17/restorative-
justice-young-offenders-crime [https://perma.cc/YUN5-J23L] (describing the growth of restorative 
justice in addressing youth crime in England). 
112 See generally John O. Haley, Crime Prevention Through Restorative Justice: Lessons from Japan 
(describing the robust use of confession apology and forgiveness in the Japanese  
criminal justice system), in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 349 (Burt 
Galaway and Joe Hudson, eds., 1996). 
113 See generally Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, Restorative Justice in New Zealand,  
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE 
PARADIGMS? 257 (2003). 
114 Practitioners have made only limited attempts to institute restorative justice principles in 
resolving domestic violence cases. See James Ptacek, Evaluation Research on Restorative Justice and 
Intimate Partner Violence: A Review and Critique 7 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://uknowledge.
uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=ipv [https://perma.cc/6P2J-QDES] (noting that the 
restorative justice approaches to domestic violence are prohibited in many jurisdictions). Perhaps the most 
comprehensive attempt to do so was spearheaded by Joan Pennell and Galle Burford, whose “family 
group” decisionmaking model aimed “to eliminate or reduce violence against . . . adult family members 
and to promote their well-being.” Id. at 8. Under this model, a conference facilitator oversees a 
collaborative process between the abuser, abused, and impacted community members. Id. at 9. All 
participants prepare beforehand for the family conference; once there, families create a plan to end the 
abuse after receiving input from community agencies. Id. at 8-9. The facilitator, with the consultation 
and approval of legal officials, must approve the plan. Id. at 9. Pennell and Burford found that families 
submitting their case to the conferencing process, unlike the comparison group who did not, saw abuser 
maltreatment decrease by half. Id. 
115 Daicoff, supra note 87, at 31. 
116 Id. at 30. 
2016] Protecting, Restoring, Improving 1575 
form of adjudication or sentencing.117 The meeting is led by a facilitator and 
usually resembles a conference.118 The process involves a discussion of the crime 
and its consequences.119 The victim and the offender each have an opportunity 
to address each other; the victim may explain how the crime affected him or 
her and the offender has the opportunity take responsibility for his or her 
actions.120 The participants then develop a plan to “heal” the crime’s negative 
effects on the victim and the community, including the possible ways that the 
offender can make reparations.121 The conference usually concludes with all 
parties agreeing on a settlement or a solution.122 
Restorative justice differs from criminal justice in both theory and practice. 
First, it promotes direct communication between victims and offenders.123 This 
element, which is noticeably absent in traditional criminal proceedings, allows 
for the possibility of negotiation, understanding, confession, reconciliation, and 
forgiveness.124 Additionally, unlike a criminal sentencing, the underlying goal of 
restorative justice is not punitive.125 Instead, it gives the offender the opportunity 
to repair harm.126 In turn, victims and communities have the ability to confront 
offenders and hold them accountable for their actions in a productive manner.127 
 
117 Id. at 31. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at 32 (detailing the practice of restorative justice in some adult criminal settings, including 
a discussion of the crime in which the victim may ask questions and express feelings about it). 
120 See, e.g., id. (using the story of a drunk driver and his victim to illustrate the practice of 
openly discussing the offense). 
121 See, e.g., id. (illustrating that restorative justice allowed a victim to express the best way for 
the offender to make amends). 
122 See, e.g., id. (describing the solution reached by restorative justice participants in which the 
offender promised to speak to the victim’s children and the victim agreed to join the offender in an 
outreach campaign against the crime at issue, drunk driving); see also NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FACILITATOR INDUCTION TRAINING 19-22 (2009) (detailing the 
procedures for conducting a restorative justice conference). 
123 See Mark S. Umbreit & Robert B. Coates, Cross-Site Analysis of Victim–Offender Mediation in 
Four States, 39 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 565, 572 (1993) (describing the victim–offender mediation 
process within the restorative justice framework, which requires both parties to meet and may put the 
offender in “the often uncomfortable position of having to face the person they victimized”). 
124 See id. at 575 (explaining that nine out of ten victims and offenders were satisfied with the 
outcome of the victim–offender mediation sessions in the study presented, which typically 
concluded with a restitution agreement). 
125 See Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized, supra note 105, at 1743 (“One 
value of restorative justice is that we should be reluctant to resort to punishment.”). 
126 See Daicoff, supra note 87, at 30 (explaining that restorative justice aims to repair the 
relationship between the offender and both the victim and the community). 
127 See id. at 31 (highlighting that the purpose behind restorative justice is to focus on 
restitution and rehabilitating the offender rather than merely imposing punishment). 
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c. Restorative Justice Outcomes 
Restorative justice advocates cite several benefits to its processes. Most 
noticeably, participant satisfaction has been recorded as between 90% and 95%.128 
Participants’ perceptions of fairness are significantly higher in restorative justices 
processes than in traditional legal proceedings.129 Additionally, studies indicate 
that restorative justice practices decrease recidivism more effectively than other 
forms of punishment.130 Finally, restorative justice practices may be less expensive 
than other legal proceedings and a less expensive punishment than incarceration.131 
Despite its purported success, rebuttals abound. Skeptics argue that 
restorative justice’s focus on rehabilitating offenders overshadows victims’ 
needs.132 Others allege that restorative justice forces victims to assist with 
offenders’ rehabilitation.133 Restorative justice practices have also been criticized 
 
128 Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized, supra note 105, at 1744. Restorative 
justice principles yield this result because of the emphasis placed on resolving disputes in the way most 
effective to meet each party’s needs. See Susan Swaim Daicoff, Families in Circle Process: Restorative 
Justice in Family Law, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 427, 430 (2015) (describing a particular restorative justice 
practice—the circle process—which aims to bring all stakeholder voices together to find mutually 
beneficial outcomes). This approach may provide the victim a forum, otherwise unavailable via 
traditional legal avenues, “in which to address complex situations in a deep and meaningful way.” Id.; 
see also Kate E. Bloch, Reconceptualizing Restorative Justice, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 201, 208 
(2010) (explaining that research supports concluding that restorative justice is effective “in increasing 
offender/victim satisfaction and restitution compliance, and decreasing offender recidivism”). 
129 See Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 106, at 26 (citing studies which found that 
offenders perceived their criminal justice proceedings as fair in 89% of cases that utilized restorative 
justice mediations compared with 78% of cases that did not). 
130 See Bloch, supra note 128, at 207-08 (describing a study that found that restorative justice 
programs reduce offender recidivism rates). While restorative justice practices encourage offenders 
to accept responsibility for the crime and its consequences, criminal proceedings may force offenders 
to deny responsibility, which has been shown to increase recidivism. See Braithwaite, Restorative 
Justice, supra note 106, at 48 (“The restorative process, by showing a path to redemption, provides 
an alternative to denial. This contrasts with the two paths the court proffers—guilt and punishment 
or innocence and impunity—a choice that makes denial an attractive possibility.”). Scholars have 
also called for incorporating therapeutic elements into family law. See, e.g., LINDA D. ELROD, 
CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:16, Westlaw (database updated June 2015) 
(arguing that restorative justice can be used in the family law context to “empower[] victims in their 
search for closure, impress[] upon offenders the real human impact of their behavior, and promote[] 
restitution to victims and communities”). 
131 See Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 106, at 70-71 (citing evidence that restorative 
justice processes have led to cost savings, particularly through the closing of juvenile institutions, 
but also admitting that studies on cost-effectiveness have limitations). 
132 See, e.g., Harry Mika et al., Listening to Victims—A Critique of Restorative Justice Policy and 
Practice in the United States, 68 FED. PROB., June 2004, at 32, 33 (claiming that restorative justice 
processes not only considers the offender’s needs but are driven by those needs, which may not be 
compatible with the victim’s interests). 
133 In the domestic violence context, critics of restorative justice are primarily concerned that its 
informal practices fail to implement safety mechanisms to address the dangers its forum poses for 
survivors. See, e.g., James Ptacek & Loretta Frederick, Restorative Justice and Intimate Partner Violence, 
NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2009), http://www.vawnet.org/domestic-
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for setting “unrealistic or unreasonable goals.”134 Victims could experience harm 
again in circumstances where offenders do not meet expectations or do not truly 
engage in the process.135 While restorative justice is not universally accepted, the 
next Section argues that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice, if used 
in conjunction, would present a dramatic improvement from the current 
American system of handling accusations of domestic violence. 
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Restorative Justice as Counterparts 
Although therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice operate as two 
distinct legal theories, they share common foundational principles: both have 
a practical dimension—they are not merely analytical frameworks, but also 
propose actual ways to practice—and both serve a therapeutic purpose by 
emphasizing emotions, empathy, healing, and individuals’ psychological  
well-being.136 Moreover, each retains elements of traditional theories of 
justice, while emphasizing problemsolving rather than punishment.137 
Therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice also diverge in certain key 
respects, however.138 For example, most therapeutic jurisprudence proponents 
do not support “shaming,” a concept that often accompanies restorative justice 
practices.139 Restorative justice also retains a broader scope than therapeutic 
jurisprudence.140 While therapeutic jurisprudence maintains a primarily 
theoretical focus, restorative justice incorporates specific practices and an 
 
violence/print-document.php?doc_id=1656&find_type=web_desc_AR [https://perma.cc/A43Z-LTPB] 
(acknowledging the criticism that “existing restorative justice models . . . fail[] to adequately address 
issues of safety and accountability”). Critics also argue that restorative justice processes may minimize 
the victim’s harm—especially given the potential to mislabel the parties as a “problem couple”—as 
opposed to recognizing it and the abuser–abused dynamic. Id. Other critics fear that participating in 
restorative justice while intimate partner violence is ongoing will pressure victims into taking 
responsibility for rehabilitating their partners and deprioritize their own victimization. Id. 
134 Mika et al., supra note 132, at 33. 
135 See id. (“[W]here offenders are not sorry for what they have done, victims may feel harmed 
again for this failure of justice.”). 
136 James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1546 (2003). 
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 1547 (noting that the two theories differ in some respects). 
139 Compare Victoria Pynchon, Shame by Any Other Name: Lessons for Restorative Justice from the 
Principles, Traditions and Practices of Alcoholics Anonymous, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 299, 300-01 
(2005) (discussing the origins of the theory of “reintegrative shaming,” which, when put into 
practice, involves holding conferences with offenders, victims, and their families and friends to 
condemn the crime while forgiving the offender), with Nolan, supra note 136, at 1548 (explaining 
Bruce Winick’s belief that “shaming” is “unfortunate”). 
140 See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 
244, 247 (2002) (noting that restorative justice is “concerned with a much wider net of consequences” 
than therapeutic justice). 
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identified set of process-oriented values.141 In spite of these differences, 
therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice together can combine to create 
a more holistic approach to legal practice.142 
III. OPPOSITION TO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO  
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION 
Most arguments against adopting alternative approaches to civil protection 
order proceedings stem from a supposed theoretical disconnect between the 
traditional civil response to domestic violence and newer, more therapeutic 
frameworks. Critics argue that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice 
principles conflict with traditional theories behind domestic violence 
intervention. Private reconciliation opportunities, victim–offender collaboration, 
and community involvement are central to therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice, but these ideas remain foreign to traditional responses and are 
antithetical to traditional theoretical frameworks. 
A. Private Reconciliations 
The law has largely abandoned domestic violence interventions that 
enable private reconciliation.143 Before the advent of civil protection order 
statutes, the criminal justice system encouraged victims to reconcile with 
their abusers outside traditional legal proceedings.144 However, anti–domestic 
violence advocates claimed that this response “failed to acknowledge the 
severity of domestic violence and put victims at serious risk” of future 
harm.145 Contemporary approaches reflect these concerns by urging active 
 
141 See id. at 247-51 (identifying the “process ideal” that characterizes restorative justice and 
delineating three groups of restorative values). 
142 Good Shepherd Mediation Program, which originated in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
provides a useful example of therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice principles working in 
tandem. Good Shepherd offers four types of mediation programs: (1) community group 
conferencing, (2) victim–offender conferencing, (3) circles, and (4) family group decisionmaking. 
About Good Shepherd Mediation Program, GOOD SHEPHERD MEDIATION PROGRAM, 
http://www.phillymediators.org/about-gsmp [https://perma.cc/E2ZZ-ZQWH] (last visited Apr. 15, 
2016). Thus, although Good Shepherd Mediation models its programs after restorative justice 
practices, elements of therapeutic jurisprudence underlie the program’s mission. 
143 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 542 (discussing how the “movement against domestic violence” 
has moved away from “responses that urge private reconciliation between the parties”). 
144 See Brian R. Decker, Violence and the Private: A Girardian Model of Domestic Violence in 
Society, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 109-10 (2007–2008) (stating that even in the twentieth 
century, because domestic violence was traditionally considered a private family matter, police 
responses remained limited to attempts to reconcile the parties). 
145 Kohn, supra note 2, at 542. 
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state involvement.146 However, therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative 
justice practices contradict this basic tenet of domestic violence intervention by 
instead supporting private reconciliations outside traditional justice systems. 
B. Victim–Offender Collaboration 
Critics also assert that victim–offender collaboration in alternative domestic 
violence interventions contradicts traditional domestic violence intervention 
theory. Domestic violence studies indicate that abusers exert power and control 
over victims through coercive interactions.147 For example, a 2009 study 
demonstrated “the inability of domestic violence victims to bargain effectively 
with their abusers” during legal interventions.148 Therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice practices, which rely on a survivor’s meaningful participation, 
may be rendered ineffective if the victim cannot freely express emotions or 
remains in fear of the abuser.149 Some critics believe that coming to a mutual 
agreement or solution—a vital aspect of both therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice—remains an impossibility where the “imbalance in power 
negates [the] victim’s ability to negotiate” with the offender.150 
Similarly, the possibility of apologies and forgiveness during victim–offender 
collaborations are central to the restorative justice paradigm. However, these two 
values may contribute to a continuing cycle of violence between abusers and their 
victims.151 Between violent episodes, an offender may apologize and promise 
cessation of violence in an effort to maintain the relationship and retain the status 
quo.152 A survivor’s acceptance of an apology may also lead to further harm. 
Indeed, a victim may accept an offender’s apology and grant forgiveness when 
the victim’s acceptance is neither fully voluntary nor healing for the victim.153 In 
 
146 See id. (“[C]ontemporary responses to domestic violence involve active state 
engagement.”). 
147 See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming 
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1121-22 (2009) (arguing that an abuser’s use of 
power and control deprives the victim of liberty and defines the victim’s experience as much as the 
abuser’s physical violence). 
148 Kohn, supra note 2, at 543 (citing Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice 
Initiatives: Who Pays if We Get It Wrong?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 223, 
223-34, 230 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002)). 
149 See id. at 543 (noting that an “intervention that relies on the meaningful participation” of an 
empowered, uncoerced victim can be highly problematic in the context of domestic violence disputes). 
150 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Susan S. Russell, Using Restorative Justice in Family 
Violence Situations, 4 CRIME VICTIMS REP. 65, 75 (2000)). 
151 See id. at 546 (discussing the role of the abuser’s apologies and promises to reform in 
maintaining the relationship and perpetuating the cycle of domestic violence, noting that they are 
“fraught with danger and complexity”). 
152 See id. (noting theories that suggest apologies “frequently serve as the glue that holds 
together a cycle of violence”). 
153 Id. 
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one study, victims admitted that even when they wanted to reject their abuser’s 
apology, they rarely did so.154 These complexities only increase concerns 
regarding victim–offender collaborations. 
C. Community Involvement 
Community involvement in therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice 
practices may contradict the traditional role of the community in domestic 
violence cases.155 In addition to accessing “both the shaming and nurturing 
influences of community in resolving conflict,” restorative justice needs 
community support to provide both parties with a peaceful environment.156 
However, critics argue that certain communities “may not be willing or able 
to fulfill [their] responsibilities” in domestic violence cases for two reasons.157 
First, victims may become isolated from friends and family as a result of 
continuing abuse and may lack meaningful community connections.158 Second, 
family and community ties might fail to denounce domestic violence and 
instead perpetuate harm.159 Communities may continue to believe “folk 
wisdom” and “myths about the causes of and treatment for domestic 
violence.”160 These belief sets can result in “victim blaming and minimization 
of abuse.”161 Given these concerns, critics argue that community involvement 
may result in more harm than good.162 
 
154 See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t I?” A Study of the 
Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 
10, 19 (1994) (reporting that subjects in the study were “extremely unlikely to indicate that they 
would reject an apology”). 
155 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 546 (noting that the emphasis on community involvement 
contravenes the “role community has traditionally played in domestic violence interventions”). 
156 Id. at 546-47 (citation omitted). 
157 Id. at 547. 
158 Id.; see also Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the 
Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 616-17 (2000) (“The batterer isolates the woman from friends, 
family, colleagues, and neighbors in an effort to maintain control. The battered woman may also 
choose to isolate herself from others in order to avoid embarrassment.” (citation omitted)). 
159 See Ruth Lewis et al., Law’s Progressive Potential: The Value of Engagement with the Law for 
Domestic Violence, 10 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 105, 119 (2001) (noting research that suggests that 
battered women often live in communities that “simply reinforce[] and support[] traditional forms 
of patriarchal power”). 
160 Kohn, supra note 2, at 548 (citation omitted); see also id. (“Community norms often tolerate or 
even support a certain level of domestic chastisement. In addition, community members might prefer 
that domestic violence remain a private matter and refuse to become involved.”(citation omitted)). 
161 See id. (noting that restorative justice practitioners “must recognize the complicit role the 
community can play by its either ignoring or condoning domestic violence”). 
162 See id. (“A central theoretical reliance on positive community influence . . . might prove 
incompatible with the reality of domestic violence.”). 
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IV. REFRAMING “JUSTICE” IN PROTECTION ORDER PROCEEDINGS 
Despite the legitimate concerns behind incorporating therapeutic approaches 
into domestic violence intervention, litigants involved in protection order 
proceedings would benefit from a combination of therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice practices. Many of the concerns outlined in Part III can be 
alleviated and, despite their different approaches, there are common goals among 
therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice, and the current civil domestic 
violence response. Incorporating therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative 
justice concepts into the existing civil protective system would address the 
system’s shortcomings and substantially improve litigants’ access to justice. 
A. Overcoming Criticisms: Why Therapeutic Approaches Prevail 
The critiques outlined in Part III of this Article raise significant concerns 
about the incorporation of alternative justice paradigms into civil domestic 
violence cases. This Section suggests that these critiques should serve as 
navigational tools, rather than roadblocks, in implementing alterative approaches 
to domestic violence in protection order proceedings. 
First, concerns related to victim participation in alternative dispute resolution 
processes are mitigated by the voluntary nature of participating in therapeutic 
jurisprudence and restorative justice practices.163 Affording a victim the 
opportunity to choose among several options for resolution not only affords a sense 
of autonomy, but also recognizes each victim’s individual needs. Indeed, rather than 
being forced to proceed in court, a victim may choose to engage in a therapeutic or 
restorative resolution tailored to his or her individual level of comfort.164 
Second, more specific theoretical critiques, such as the potential dangers 
of collaboration among victims and offenders, are also misplaced. Critics 
argue that therapeutic and restorative justice concepts have adverse effects on 
domestic violence interventions because they place victims at an increased 
risk of coercion.165 However, current domestic violence theories suggest that 
a portion—possibly even the majority—of violent relationships stem from 
“situational couple violence,” where violence is linked to the escalation of 
 
163 See C. Quince Hopkins, Tempering Idealism with Realism: Using Restorative Justice Processes to 
Promote Acceptance of Responsibility in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 311, 
341 (2012) (stating that any process that does not honor or place the wishes of the victim at its center 
is “not truly a restorative justice approach”). 
164 See id. at 322 (stating that the criminal process “often fail[s] to address the victims’ physical 
and emotional safety needs” and that it “may force victims to move more quickly . . . than is 
psychologically advisable”). 
165 See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
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specific conflicts rather than control.166 Domestic violence affects a diverse 
set of relationships, some less intimate than others.167 In cases where the 
parties have relatively little history between them or lack complex 
relationship dynamics, collaboration may not only be appropriate but may 
also be more effective than traditional protection order proceedings.168 
Further, in cases where survivors remain with their partners,169 efforts to 
facilitate collaboration may also “assist in securing the victim’s safety.”170 
B. Common Ground Shared by Current and Alternative Approaches 
Despite their procedural differences, traditional civil responses to domestic 
violence and alternative justice paradigms share many common goals. At the 
broadest level, civil protection order statutes aim to provide domestic violence 
survivors with a more comprehensive, more flexible range of relief than is 
available in the criminal justice system.171 Therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice principles promote these same goals.172 Indeed, where a 
survivor maintains a relationship or frequent contact with an abuser, therapeutic 
alternatives may even exceed the goals advanced by the current civil approach.173 
 
166 Michael P. Johnson, Domestic Violence: It’s Not About Gender—Or Is It?, 67 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 1126, 1127 (2005). It is important to note that alternative approaches such as therapeutic 
jurisprudence and restorative justice may be most appropriate when limited to these scenarios, and 
where control issues do not predominate. See Ptacek, supra note 114, at 12 (describing how certain cases 
of intimate partner violence are not suited for mediation, including “where the domination of the male 
partner is demonstrated, ascertained, and defended by the use of physical violence” (citation omitted)). 
167 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 556 (discussing some of the less intimate relationships nonetheless 
covered under domestic violence protection statutes, including “those who share a common partner, 
or strangers who stalk or are being stalked”). 
168 Cf. id. (positing that less complicated relationships may not “merit restorative justice 
intervention” precisely because of “their lack of complexity”). 
169 See Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to 
Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 512 (2003) (finding that 17.3% 
of women in their study were planning “to continue an intimate relationship with their batterer” 
and that 39.3% were planning to “at least remain in contact with their abusers in the future”). 
170 Kohn, supra note 2, at 556. 
171 See id. at 553 (noting that one of the goals in adopting protection order statutes was to make 
“broader and more flexible relief” available to survivors). 
172 See id. (arguing that restorative justice programs “may enhance the attainment” of the goals 
underlying civil protection order statutes). 
173 See, e.g., ALAN EDWARDS & SUSAN SHARPE, MEDIATION & RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
CTR., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW 6 (2004), https://s3.amazonaws.com/mrjc/restorative_justice_DV_Lit_Review.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6LTK-K33P] (reporting that the results of a South African restorative justice study 
implementing victim–offender mediation demonstrated that “[w]here couples had stayed together, 
the women reported improved communication and a reduction in verbal abuse”); see also Ptacek, 
supra note 114, at 9 (reporting on a study which found that when children are involved in the 
restorative justice process, extended family feels more compelled to intervene to end the abuse). 
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First, both traditional and alternative approaches aim to promote victim 
safety.174 Although restorative justice advocates emphasize healing, they also 
uniformly measure recidivism and reabuse rates, which are then incorported into 
program effectiveness analyses.175 Second, just as protection order proceedings 
provide survivors with an avenue through which they may be heard, therapeutic 
alternatives also offer a forum for survivors to express themselves.176 In fact, 
many survivors may find speaking informally in a conference setting to be “less 
daunting than [testifying in] the courtroom.”177 Finally, both traditional 
protection order proceedings and alternative paradigms attempt to incorporate 
a holistic approach to domestic violence intervention, one which “address[es] 
complex situations in a deep and meaningful way.”178 Finally, protection order 
statutes provide additional relief to survivors by making available family law and 
social service remedies.179 Similarly, therapeutic approaches allow parties to craft 
specific resolutions to meet their needs.180 
C. Coming to an Agreement: Therapeutic Alternatives as a Supplement to 
Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act 
Considering alternative approaches as a supplement to, rather than a 
replacement for, the current civil justice system may help to alleviate lingering 
concerns about the role restorative justice practices may play in Pennsylvania.181 
This Essay suggests a gradual, voluntary introduction of alternative legal 
paradigms into preexisting civil justice systems. Therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice principles already have a place in most civil domestic violence 
statutes.182 For instance, Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act could 
incorporate alternative justice approaches into the current system with minimal 
effort, yet those minor changes could have a dramatic impact on the lives of 
domestic abuse victims. 
 
174 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 526-27 (surveying studies on the effectiveness of traditional and 
alternative approaches at increasing victim safety). 
175 See, e.g., Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Family Group Decision Making: Protecting Children and 
Women, 79 CHILD WELFARE 131, 145-47 (2000) (highlighting that participants in family group 
decisionmaking therapies report greater interfamilial safety). 
176 See supra Section II.A. 
177 Kohn, supra note 2, at 554. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. (discussing how protection order statutes “have expanded the scope of relief . . . to 
include family law and social service remedies”). 
180 See id. at 555 (reflecting on how therapeutic programs “create time and space” for the parties 
to reach resolutions particular to the parties’ needs). 
181 Indeed, an optimal approach views restorative justice and the current legal paradigm as 
symbiotic, rather than mutually exclusive, and any restorative process would be an optional 
alternative to current programs. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 2, at 554-55 (pointing out a District of Columbia statute affording 
the judge the power to “grant any relief that is ‘appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter’”). 
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Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act allows for orders by agreement.183 
Excluding cases where the petitioner did not appear or withdrew the PFA 
petition, almost half of Philadelphia’s remaining PFA adjudications resulted in 
an agreement between the parties.184 However, the word “agreement” should be 
understood loosely in this context. An agreement between the parties does not 
necessarily require that the litigants actually speak directly to one another. 
Instead, litigants may communicate through their attorneys, or, in cases where 
the litigants are unrepresented, through court staff or even the presiding judge. 
As a result, agreements may be made without any real discussion between the 
parties regarding what precipitated the initial filing. This is problematic for two 
reasons. First, petitioners may agree to less protection than they actually need. 
Second, respondents may not understand what exactly they are agreeing to, or, 
more fundamentally, the lasting consequences of their actions. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice principles stand as a viable 
way to address these problems. If a victim chooses to negotiate an order by 
agreement with the abuser, the incorporation of a restorative justice regime into 
the ensuing negotiation process would ensure an equitable bargaining dynamic, 
and, ultimately a more equitable result—assurances that are otherwise absent 
from the way in which parties currently bargain for an order by agreement.185 
While in theory this concept seems ideal, implementation does remain a 
problem. Most case studies examining the efficacy of therapeutic jurisprudence 
and restorative justice involved abused parties who participated on a volunteer 
basis.186 Further, states have been reluctant to incorporate a sanctioned mediation 
system that uses restorative justice practices and therapeutic jurisprudence ideals 
into their PFA proceedings.187 However, states can implement this process on a 
volunteer basis, as was the usual method for introduction in previous case studies. 
For example, currently all PFA petitions in Philadelphia must first go before 
a judge in an ex parte hearing.188 In filling out the relevant paperwork, a 
petitioner might indicate a willingness to adjudicate his or her petition through 
mediation. Thus, an ex parte hearing would be held—and an interim PFA order 
perhaps granted. However, where petitioners elected to submit their case to a 
mediator, the final PFA hearing—which is required to occur within ten days of 
the ex parte hearing189—would not need to be scheduled. Instead, the court 
 
183 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
185 See Busch, supra note 148, at 229 (explaining that the inequitable dynamic between victim 
and abuser impedes meaningful negotiations). 
186 See, e.g., Ptacek, supra note 114, at 17 (“[P]articipation is strictly voluntary.”). 
187 However, one realm in which states have incorporated this form of mediation is in the context 
of custody disputes. See, e.g., CHESTER CTY. CUSTODY RULES AND FORMS 1915.4.A(a)(1) (“All 
complaints for custody . . . shall be scheduled for meditation within thirty (30) days of filing . . . .”). 
188 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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would refer the petition to mediation. The abused party would pursue this route 
knowing it would likely result in an order by agreement rather than an order 
unilaterally decided by a court. However, unlike the current status quo, a guided 
mediation process would ensure that abuse victims are not bullied or intimidated 
into inadequate agreements.190 Instead, the mediation process would place an 
emphasis on both empowerment and resolution. That is, therapeutic jurisprudence 
and restorative justice ideals would inform the process. 
These principles would provide an answer to the current deficiencies that 
corrupt the manner in which orders by agreement are reached. The typical 
agreement process attendant to PFA litigation typically stymies a victim’s ability to 
attain both adequate and meaningful relief. In its place, the mediation would foster 
a supervised, open dialogue. The victim would direct the discourse; the mediator 
would act in a facilitative capacity. This collaborative process could also lead parties 
to explore other corollary alternatives to traditional civil protection orders, 
including counseling, coparenting opportunities, and drug and alcohol programs. 
Utilizing alternative approaches as a supplement to the current civil 
protection order proceeding model—rather than replacing it entirely—serves 
many purposes. First, traditional proceedings would remain available for cases in 
which alternative approaches may not be appropriate. Second, alternative 
approaches positively contribute and potentially eliminate many challenges faced 
by family courts, particularly crowded court dockets and the increasing number 
of self-represented litigants. Finally, they address a host of litigants’ needs outside 
of the need for physical protection and instead focus on restoring relationships 
and preventing future instances of domestic violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Incorporating restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence concepts into 
civil protection order proceedings would resolve many issues facing litigants and 
courts alike. First, a therapeutic approach would facilitate a more sensitive 
response to one of the most sensitive areas of legal practice. Second, introducing 
a nonjudicial alternative to traditional protection order hearings would preserve 
valuable court resources. Finally, affording litigants more personalized avenues 
of relief would ensure victim autonomy and offender participation. 
In the two scenarios set out in the introduction of this Essay, the traditional 
protection order process failed to adequately meet the litigants’ needs. Neither 
Petitioner One nor Two benefited from the civil justice system’s available 
resources. Likewise, neither Respondent One nor Two accepted responsibility 
 
190 See Busch, supra note 148, at 245-46 (arguing that hybrid systems should only be utilized 
where safety mechanisms are in place). 
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for his actions. Finally, and most importantly, none of the parties involved 
acquired the necessary tools to decrease the likelihood of a future filing.191 
This Essay argues that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice 
principles could vastly improve both outcomes. If Petitioners One or Two chose 
to participate in an alternative approach akin to the solution proposed in this 
Essay, all parties, as well as the civil justice system as a whole, could have 
substantially benefited. Petitioner One and Respondent One could have had a 
meaningful, facilitated discussion about the incident that precipitated the 
Petitioner’s filing. Respondent One may have better understood how he made 
Petitioner One feel, while Petitioner One could have made a more informed 
decision about whether to withdraw her petition. In the second case, both parties 
may have come to an agreement regarding custody if they had had an opportunity 
to openly share their concerns with each other. Petitioner Two’s concerns could 
have been heard, rather than deemed “not credible” by a third party with limited 
access to evidence. Respondent Two may have been persuaded to take parenting 
classes or to undergo counseling. 
These scenarios serve as only two examples of the lives that could be changed 
by incorporating the alternative approaches of therapeutic jurisprudence and 
restorative justice principles into protection order proceedings. Rather than 
merely protecting survivors, an enhanced, therapeutic civil response could restore 
relationships, redefine communities, and finally loosen the grip of domestic 
violence on our society today. 
 
191 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
